(If this song is stuck in your head all day long, you are welcome.)

As my loyal readers are aware (too Bridgerton?), customer due diligence obligations, especially for distributors and manufacturers, have significantly evolved over the past several years.  When I joined the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) nearly two decades ago (back when registrants

There is legislation making the rounds on Capitol Hill that seeks to provide clarity regarding the process for reviewing orders for controlled substances to determine if an order is a “suspicious order” that should be reported to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and withheld from shipment.  Sponsored by Rep. Harshbarger (R-Tenn.), the title of the bill is the “Block, Report, and Suspend Suspicious Shipments Act of 2022.” An identical bill, was passed in the House of Representative in the last Congress; however, it did not come up for a vote in the Senate. 

What does it say?

On January 20, 2023, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA’s) issued a Guidance Document reiterating DEA’s long-held position regarding the detection and reporting of suspicious orders. Specifically, DEA “clarified” that “neither the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) nor [DEA] regulations establish quantitative thresholds or place limits on the volume of controlled substances DEA registrants can order and dispense.”

Why the need for a clarification? 

As I was reviewing the public comments regarding the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA’s) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) providing a much-needed update to the agency’s suspicious order regulations, I noticed a similar issue raised by multiple commenters.  Apart from the myriad of comments and requests seeking greater clarity from DEA on several definitions and provisions, there appears to remain a misunderstanding of using the 5% rule for distributions amongst practitioners.

Update: DEA has reopened the comment period for the proposed rulemaking from February 25, 2021, until March 29, 2021.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) published its long-awaited Notice of Proposed Rulemaking  (NPRM)  regarding suspicious orders of controlled substances. This will likely be the most heavily scrutinized rule issued by DEA this year. Registrants impacted by this rule should submit comments by March 29, 2021.

On June 5, 2020, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) received an Interim Final Rule from the Drug Enforcement Administration titled, Implementation of the SUPPORT Act: Dispensing and Administering Controlled Substances for Medicated-Assisted Treatment.  This rule implements certain provisions of the SUPPORT Act “relating to the expansion of medication-assisted treatment providers and to the delivery of a controlled substance by a pharmacy to a practitioner.”

In response to issues raised by the Healthcare Distribution Alliance (“HDA”), earlier this week the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) published additional guidance for DEA-registered distributors on the agency’s COVID-19 Information Page.  Among other issues previously addressed by DEA, the recent guidance addresses suspicious order monitoring and conducting due diligence on customers.

It appears that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is on the cusp of publishing a new regulation in the next few weeks, with two more to follow in the coming months.  This is based on notifications received by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the government’s final review authority for Executive Branch regulations.

On January 20, 2020, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released its report Drug Control: Actions Needed to Ensure Usefulness of Data on Suspicious Opioid Orders.  The report, mandated by Congress in the SUPPORT Act, focuses almost exclusively on the need for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to beef up its capabilities for analyzing the vast amount of data provided to DEA by registrants. GAO’s investigation revealed, among other things, that DEA conducted “limited proactive and robust analysis of industry reported data” and that DEA did not have the appropriate data governance structure in place to manage drug transaction data.